May 30, 2007
Pave: Ségo, Amateur Prognosticator
Le jour 15 de Sarko
Dans cette campagne, il y aura des embûches... Il y aura des chutes mais nous nous relèverons, il y aura des entorses mais nous les soignerons, il y aura des pièges mais nous les contournerons.
[In this campaign, there will be pitfalls... There will be tumbles but we will rise up again, there will be wounds but we will heal ourselves, there will be traps but we will go around them.]
Ségolène Royal,
PS presidential wannabee
from her investiture speech
November 26, 2006 (Désirs d'avenir)
Well, Ségo got this half right, the bits about tumbles, wounds, and traps. Not so prescient about all the rising, healing, and flanking. Let's see if she does better forecasting post-election outcomes.
Le choix de Nicolas Sarkozy est un choix dangereux. ... Ma responsabilité, aujourd'hui, c'est de lancer une alerte par rapport au risque de cette candidature et par rapport aux violences et aux brutalités qui se déclencheront dans le pays.
[The choice of Nicolas Sarkozy is a dangerous choice... My responsibility, today, is to sound the alarm about the risks of this candidacy and speak to the violence and brutality that will be triggered in the country.]
Ségo,
presidential washout greenlighting chaos in France
May 4, 2007 (MSN)
SARKOZY CAMP IN POLE POSITION
FOR FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY VOTE
PARIS May 21, 2007 (AFP) - According to a TNS-SOFRES opinion poll, [L'UMP, the party of Sarko,] would secure 365 to 415 seats, against 137 to 153 for the main opposition Socialists. The Communist Party would take two to nine seats, with two or three going to the new centrist party founded by presidential candidate Francois Bayrou, Modem.*
FRENCH SATISFIED WITH APPOINTED CABINET
May 25, 2007 (Angus Reid) - Many people in France are pleased with their new national government, according to a poll by OpinionWay** published by Le Journal du Dimanche. 69 per cent of respondents are satisfied with the composition of prime minister François Fillion’s cabinet.
"Many people" strikes us as a weak characterization for a 69% consensus, especially a French consensus, most especially a French political consensus.
DYNAMIC SARKOZY GETS EARLY THUMBS UP FROM FRENCH
PARIS May 25, 2007 (SOSD/Reuters) – President Nicolas Sarkozy has wowed the French during his first week in office thanks to his dynamism and hands-on approach to the job, according to an opinion poll published on Friday.... An opinion poll in Le Figaro newspaper said 91 percent of French people found their new leader to be dynamic, 85 percent thought he was modern and 75 percent thought he was easygoing.
... Some 87 percent of people thought Sarkozy was showing himself to be a different kind of leader to his predecessors and 70 percent said he was living up to their expectations.
... The Figaro poll said 67 percent of people approved of [Sarko's omnibus reforms].
... The poll said 67 percent of people thought the Socialist party was wrong to urge voters not to hand Sarkozy a majority in next month's parliamentary election.
Hhmmm. As a prognosticator, we'd advise Ségo not to quit her day job. Oh. [Pause.] She already has.
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* Only two or three seats for Modem? That's a little less than the "excellent" forecast of 8-13 reported by The Independent only two weeks ago.
** OpinionWay, good news mongers in the pay of L'UMP -- or so the Socialists contend.
PFFT (What is this?): One-third accurate 3 | Rayonnement français 0
Posted by Damian at May 30, 2007 03:30 AMBonjour,
It's been awhile since I posted on Pave or here… some educational commitments made me quit posting cold turkey…one can waste, I mean, spend way too much time on these blogs. However, the commitments are finished, and I am ready to continue to test and expand my mind again on the pages of the blogs. What fun….
The Washington Times earlier this week ran an interesting commentary about what Washington can expect from allies in Europe, especially France, since the election of Sarkozy, and Britain, with the advancement of Brown replacing Blair.
The article boiled down to these main points as far as what the US could, or should expect from France.
1. Strong alliances are rooted in shared interests, not personalities. So, even a pro-American such as Sarkozy must consider what and how alignment with the US will bolster the "geopolitical welfare" of France. For instance, Britain and Brown can obtain more "global influence" by aligning with the US, and unfortunately, "France under Nicolas Sarkozy will still be a power whose international profile is enhanced more by defying U.S. power than by accommodating it…" Well, I agree. Even if Sarkozy likes us, I'm afraid it will be more of the same for awhile.
2. In the closest alliances, reciprocity matters. If the costs of France siding with America outweigh the benefits, she will not be interested in sharing our views. An example of this is the way Poland feels shortchanged for helping in Iraq.
3. Don't forget 1 and 2 It would be a mistake to forget about our traditional allies while hoping that the election of Sarkozy will mend matters with France. How much will Sarkozy even be willing to repair relations with the US, and should the US spend any time knowing that we will not get much in return – especially in areas where we do need help; for example, do you think we will see help in Iraq or reinforcements for Afghanistan from the French? I don't. And if they did, what could we offer in return?
So, alliances are built on more than just election results, and I'm not sure if there is much win/win for either side here - however pleased I am with the election results.
PS - you have my email address so I did not use in this post..
Andy,
All rational policies of a nation serve that nation's interests. French policy for the past 60 years has been crafted to a pre-1939 idea of France, a France that does not exist, a France that cannot practically exist.
French dreams of a multipolar world in which France is so aligned with disparate polarites as to be a counterweight to the United States are fanciful, practically unworkable, and not in the national interests of France, unless the national interests of France amount to little more than maintaining appearances.
We think French policy and methods will change under Sarko if only because, unlike Jack, he is not openly antagonistic to America. At the same time, French attitudes toward America have been long in the making and are entrenched in French bureaucratic institutions such as the ENA and the Quai d'Orsay. So we do not expect French policy and methods to change much.
As for reciprocity, well, this is more often than not preached to America as a one-way street. We would invert the question and ask do the benefits of French support outweigh the costs to America?
The truth is America benefits very little from French support. For example, the French are more trouble than they are worth in any military coalition. With France in the mix, strategic objectives are subordinated to French amour propre. France as a nation has not had the stomach for war since 1917. It advertises its armed forces as peacekeepers. Yet photogenic peacekeepers are useless when there is no peace to keep (e.g., Lebanon, Côte d'Ivoire) or where combat troops are needed (e.g., Afghanistan). France insists on complicated rules of engagement that make engagement improbable (e.g., Afghanistan, Lebanon).
Jack sought French greatness by making France a magnet for anyone with a complaint or grudge against America. And did Jack's collection of odd-bedfellows (e.g., Arafat, Chavez, Castro, Mugabe, Putain, et al.) advance France one rung up the French greatness ladder? We would argue, no. And we think Sarko would agree with us.
America would rather have a French ally than a France scheming against American interests. But America does not need a French ally predicated on subordinating American interests to French interests.
When Sarko says:
"But I also want to tell [the United States] that friendship is accepting that one's friends can think differently..."
We say, yes, yes we do. We only hope he can accept that.
Glad to see you back in the threads.
Regards,
DGB
Glad to be back.
Certain parts of the "pre-1939" military mind set still exist, I would wager. France's strategy then, as now, was one of a defensive mindset only, and therefore, alliances designed to provide her aid if she was attacked. See the treaty with Poland; France had no intention of ever aiding Poland, yet signed treaties in the hope that if France was attacked, Poland would join in repelling the foes – most likely figured to be the Germans.
We would invert the question and ask do the benefits of French support outweigh the costs to America? Interesting question….I would say the more bellicose Russia becomes to the US, America is able to raise the level of "costs" in order to deal with France.
Jack sought French greatness by making France a magnet for anyone with a complaint or grudge against America. And did Jack's collection of odd-bedfellows (e.g., Arafat, Chavez, Castro, Mugabe, Putain, et al.)
As for Putain, see my comment above; As for Chavez, where is the outcry from the world as he seizes land, business and shuts down the "opposition" media? But I agree in the fact Sarkozy will not join forces with these folks…. at least not yet. Putain, with the gaz will always be a problem, and France's desire for it may produce alliances with Russia such as US has with Arab world….
When Sarko says:
"But I also want to tell [the United States] that friendship is accepting that one's friends can think differently..."
Let's hope that he means we can think differently as well – globalization, religion, Kyoto Protocol, terrorism, capitalism – to name a few where we think France is on the wrong side. As you say, reciprocity is a two way street.
